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Abstract 
 
 
The present paper analyzes the effect of childbirth on Spanish women’s decisions to withdraw 
from paid work, defined here as the transition from employment to out of the labor force due to 
the requirements of household production. Decisions regarding fertility and labor market 
participation are interrelated and depend on individual and household characteristics, as well as 
external variables such as the availability of childcare services. We postulate that a female’s 
decision to leave the labor market is taken in a household context, and thus is the outcome 
which maximizes household welfare after taking into account the employment and earnings 
characteristics of all household members. We pay special attention to the effect of the male 
partner’s characteristics upon the female’s decision to withdraw from the labor market. Our 
empirical results show that in order to better define social and labor market policies on work and 
family reconciliation, increased attention should be paid to the job characteristics of males given 
their effect on the optimal assignment of tasks within the household following childbirth. 
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1. Introduction and background 
 
The gradual incorporation of women into the labor market characterized all developed 
economies during the second half of the twentieth century, leading to a continuous increase in 
female employment rates. The rise in the educational levels of women and, consequently, the 
higher opportunity cost of household production, are the main explanation for this secular trend. 
Not only have employment rates been affected by higher investment in female human capital, 
but also other social transformations have occurred. The postponement of marriage and 
maternity or the fall in fertility rates demonstrate that the increasing rate of return of female paid 
work has a far-reaching impact on modern society.  
While the increasing female employment rate has helped to reduce the existing gender 
gap, some key differences still persist, particularly when we explore male and female 
employment rates across the life cycle from a household perspective. According to Eurostat 
figures for the EU-251, the employment rate for childless women aged 20-49 is 75%, but for 
women with children under 12 months this rate is only 60%. By contrast, the employment rate 
for childless men is higher (86%); a rate that is even higher (91%) if they have children under 
one year old. 
 These figures can be explained coherently by the fact that some women leave the labor 
market following childbirth (Becker, 1965). This “return to the home” may be related to strong 
female preferences for children as some authors have pointed out (Carrasco, 2001; Alvarez-
Llorente, 2002; De la Rica and Ferrero, 2003; Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2008). Nevertheless, in 
most cases the explanation lies in the difficulties involved in reconciling work and family 
following childbirth (see OECD, 2007, 2011; Eurostat, 2007).  
In this paper we explore the factors surrounding this “return to home” decision. We aim 
to analyze the effect of childbirth on women’s decision to leave the labor market not as an 
isolated choice but as the result of a collective decision of a couple that reallocates their time 
after maternity. In particular, we study the effect of childbirth on the probability of transition 
from employment to out of the labor force2 due to housework reasons as these are the only ones 
related with the production of home services and thus the only reasons that could be associated 
to difficulties in reconciling work and family.  
Among the determinants of women’s probability of leaving the labor market, we pay 
special attention to the effect that the male partner’s job characteristics could have on this 
probability. As Mincer (1962) originally pointed out, the relative characteristics of the partners’ 
employment have a relevant effect on women’s decisions regarding their labor market 
participation. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, these characteristics have not been 
                                                 
1 See Alliaga (2005) 
2 Transitions from employment to unemployment, which represent 4% of total employment flows, are not considered in this 
analysis. 
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sufficiently explored in the empirical literature3. Regarding such characteristics, we not only 
consider husband’s wage as is common in the literature, but also analyze the effect of some 
covariates related to the existence of restrictions on the time that partners can dedicate to 
household production. Our initial hypothesis is that, after controlling for other relevant 
variables, the partner’s job characteristics will have a non-negligible effect on the female’s 
employment decision following maternity.  
The interdependencies of decisions taken within the household have received increasing 
attention in theoretical and empirical economics since the seminal work of Mincer (1962) and 
the introduction of the collective approach to household behavior by Chiappori (1988, 1992, 
1997) and Apps and Rees (1988). Under the collective model of household behavior, once the 
decision to have a child has been taken, both members must decide how much time should be 
reallocated to labor market activities, household production and leisure time in order to 
maximize household utility. As having a child increases the consumption of household 
resources, previously optimal decisions of household members regarding time allocation will be 
altered by the birth decision. As Rapoport et al. (2011) and Rizavi and Sofer (2010) point out, 
the impact of a child on the reallocation of time in a collective model among household 
members is not identical. When children are present, mothers and fathers increase their total 
hours of work (paid and unpaid work). Nonetheless, women strongly reduce market work, while 
fathers do not. One possible outcome of intra-household time reallocation is that one parent 
withdraws from the labor market and dedicates all of his (her) non-leisure time to household 
production (childcare). The findings of Fernandez-Val (2003) for the Spanish case confirm this 
view. Specifically, he shows that fertility variables are highly significant for women and have a 
negative impact on the female labor supply, but are not significant for men. It seems clear that, 
following childbirth, men and women re-evaluate their previous decisions concerning paid and 
unpaid work in an asymmetric manner.   
The way that household members reallocate their time (among paid and unpaid 
activities) after maternity bears a close relationship with the gender wage gap. When there are 
wage differences between members of a household it may be fully rational that the individual 
with lower earnings will leave the labor market following maternity, while his (her) partner will 
increase his (her) time in paid work. This is the original idea of Mincer (1962), who argues that 
it is more likely that the wife will leave her job after childbirth if the male partner’s income is 
higher. Nonetheless, other authors such as Rizavi and Sofer (2010) have raised an interesting 
issue. They find that the more a woman’s partner earns relative to her, the less housework she 
performs. In addition, as these authors remark, the woman’s wage also has a positive and 
significant impact upon external help. One possible reason for their result is that as the intensity 
                                                 
3 Other authors have also pointed out the lack of empirical literature analyzing the effect of male partners’ job characteristics on 
women’s labor market decisions (see, for instance, Esping-Andersen et al., 2007; Baizán, 2007; Ahn and Mira, 2001). 
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of women’s investment in their career increases, housework is substituted partially by men and 
partially by some kind of external paid help. 
Although in a partial equilibrium analysis with exogenous wages the higher the wage 
gap, the more likely a woman is to drop out of the labor force following childbirth, the logical 
question is what causes it. Unsurprisingly, one of the most commonly cited causes of the gender 
wage gap is the transition from employment to out of the labor force following childbirth. As 
Apps and Rees (2005) note, differences in earnings and employment between the sexes can be 
due to life cycle variations in time use (paid/unpaid work). In a similar vein, Gunderson (1989) 
argues that the differing childcare responsibilities of males and females may produce gender 
wage discrimination. Walfogel (1997) states that such gaps can be partially explained by a 
human capital argument. Since women with children spend longer periods out of the labor 
market, their labor market experience and hence their level of human capital accumulation 
declines. The empirical literature shows that wage gaps are also observed between females with 
and without children. For instance, Molina and Montuenga (2009) compare the wages of 
mothers and non-mothers in the same period of time and find a wage penalty of about 9% 
among mothers even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Using data from the 
Spanish Continuous Sample of Working Histories, Fernandez-Kranz and Rodriguez-Planas 
(2010) find that “mothers to be” compared to non-mothers present relevant increases in their 
wages several years before their first child, while their earnings after giving birth decrease in a 
significant manner.   
Once the decision to have a child has been taken, other variables affect the optimal 
decisions regarding intra-household time allocation, namely the availability and cost of 
externally provided childcare services and the institutional characteristics of the labor market 
affecting job security. 
The availability and cost of childcare services significantly affect women’s decisions 
concerning non-market time versus time spent on paid work. One of the most commonly 
adopted social policy measures aimed at reducing gender inequalities is the provision of greater 
opportunities to combine market work and childbearing. Such policies reduce the cost of 
childcare services directly via subsidies or public childcare services, and indirectly through 
flexible working arrangements (part-time work, telework, etc.), thus allowing households to 
reduce their need for external childcare services while simultaneously maintaining the parents’ 
sources of income. The explanatory power of these social policies have been demonstrated in 
empirical models of female labor supply. Del Boca et al. (2009) highlight that social policy 
differences across European countries partially explain the differences observed in women’s 
labor market participation. Moreover, Kögel (2004) states that the increase in the availability of 
childcare services has been an important factor in converting the relationship between women’s 
participation and fertility rates from negative to positive. Additionally, it has an effect not only 
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on female labor supply, but could also affect fertility decisions. In this sense, Baizán (2009) 
finds that the availability of childcare services has a positive effect on the probability of having 
a child in Spain. 
Finally, variables related to job security are also likely to affect female labor market 
participation and maternity decisions. These variables have received increased attention in 
recent empirical literature. Among them, the type of contract is the most cited (see for example 
Ahn and Mira, 2001; De la Rica and Iza, 2005; Esping-Andersen et al., 2007; Baizán, 2009 and 
García-Ferreira and Villanueva, 2007). Besides being more unstable, jobs with fixed-term 
contracts are usually paid less, thus reducing the opportunity cost of renouncing this type of 
jobs. In such cases, we would expect that women working with a temporary contract would be 
more likely to leave the labor market, especially after giving birth. This is particularly relevant 
in Spain due to its highly segmented labor market4. For the same reasons we could expect 
unstable labor situations to have a negative effect on maternity decisions. The clearest evidence 
of this feature for the Spanish case was found by De la Rica and Iza (2005), who illustrated that 
childless women with fixed-term contracts delay their entry into maternity longer than those 
with permanent contracts. 
In summary, we analyze the effect of childbirth on female labor market withdrawal 
decisions taking into account all these factors. The empirical analysis is based on microdata 
from the Spanish Labor Force Survey, which is the most appropriate statistical source for the 
analysis of labor market characteristics in Spain. This survey offers highly detailed information 
on the employment situation of all family members, as well as very rich information on 
household characteristics.  
Furthermore, in order to account for the possible endogeneity surrounding the decision 
to have a child (see, among others, Bover and Arellano, 1995; Carrasco, 2001; Alvarez-
Llorente, 2002; De la Rica and Ferrero, 2003; Gutierrez-Domènech, 2008; Baizán, 2009 and 
Angrist and Evans, 1998), we follow Del Boca et al. (2009) and jointly estimate labor market 
withdrawal and maternity decisions using a bivariate probit model.  
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 explains the 
database and variables and Section 3 presents a descriptive analysis of the job withdrawal 
decision. Section 4 and Section 5 describe the econometric approach and discuss the empirical 
results, respectively. Lastly, Section 6 concludes.   
                                                 
4 See, among others, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; Toharia and Malo, 1999; Davia and Hernanz, 2004 and 
Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno, 2002. 
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2. Data and variables 
 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper is based on microdata from the Spanish 
Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA hereafter). The EPA is a quarterly 
survey which targets households and is the most important statistical database for the analysis of 
labor market characteristics in Spain. The sample comprises 60,000 households per quarter and 
involves approximately 180,000 individuals. Consequently, the EPA contains highly 
comprehensive information on the personal and labor characteristics of each household member 
and on household characteristics (see Garrido et al., 2000). The majority of the information in 
the EPA refers to the reference week, but the survey also includes several retrospective 
variables concerning the labor situation and job characteristics in the previous year.  
The database comprises a pool of cross-sectional data corresponding to four waves of 
the second quarters of the EPA from 2001 to 2004. We have selected this period in order to 
obtain a sufficient number of observations as well as a homogenous sample. Due to Eurostat 
requirements, in 2005 there was a relevant methodological change in the EPA which affected 
the estimation of different labor situations in a significant manner5. In addition, the business 
cycle changed in 2007, which restricted the potential period of analysis only to the years 2005 
and 2006. For these two reasons we finally decided to analyze the period 2001-2004.  
Our subsample consists of Spanish women aged 20 to 44 years cohabiting with their 
husbands (or partners) as either the householder or the householder’s partner. As we have 
mentioned previously, we are interested in the effect that the male partner’s job characteristics 
have on women’s labor market withdrawal decisions. Thus, we only consider women whose 
partner is employed during the reference week (t), which represents 93% of the initial 
subsample6. In addition, this selection allows us to guarantee that there is at least one labor 
income in the household.  
We consider that a woman has decided to leave the labor market if she is out of the 
labor force due to housework reasons in the reference week of the survey (period t) and she 
declares that she was working one year ago (period t-1). It is necessary to mention that 
individuals who are on parental leave during the reference week are considered to be employed 
in the Spanish Labor Force Survey. As we pointed out previously, we only focus on housework 
reasons because these are the only reasons that can be associated to the existence of difficulties 
in reconciling work and family. As the EPA contains very rich information about the possible 
reasons for not being in the labor force, we have excluded dropouts for reasons such as 
retirement, disability or studies from the analysis. In any case, housework is the main reason for 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of the methodological changes introduced in 2005 see 
http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/daco4211/menuepa05.htm  
6 As we would expect, previous versions of the model presented here show that if the male partner is unemployed or out of the labor 
market, their wives would be less likely to leave the labor market. This result is coherent with previous studies such as Heckman 
and MaCurdy (1980, 1982) or Stephens (2002), who find that husbands’ unemployment has a positive effect on female labor supply.  
Review of Economics of the Household (2012), 10 (3): 441-468 
The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11150-012-9151-z  
7 
women to leave their jobs. The final subsample consists of 29,534 women7 with the 
characteristics mentioned above.  
The variables used in the empirical analysis are summarized in Table 1 and classified 
into six categories: personal characteristics, having a newborn and other household 
characteristics, male partner’s job characteristics, women’s job characteristics and the 
availability of childcare services.  
Personal characteristics include age (5 categories) and educational attainment (primary 
or less, secondary and tertiary). Having a newborn is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if we 
observe in period t that a woman has a child under twelve months of age and zero otherwise. 
This implies that for women with a newborn in period t, the childbirth occurred between period 
t-1 (one year prior) and period t (reference week). 
Among household characteristics, we consider the existence of other children and their 
ages as well as a dummy indicating if there are grandparents cohabiting with the couple. We 
also include marital status as a proxy of the degree of mutual commitment to the union. 
Our analysis primarily focuses on the effect that the male partner’s job characteristics 
have on the probability of a woman deciding to leave the labor market. Among these 
characteristics we consider two types of variables: the male partner’s income and some 
covariates related to the existence of restrictions on the time that they can dedicate to childcare 
and housework. As the EPA unfortunately offers no information regarding wages, we estimate 
the male partner’s earnings as a wage equation using microdata from the Spanish Structure of 
Earnings Survey (EES). As covariates, the estimated wage equation includes the male partner’s 
age (and its square), detailed educational attainment, seniority, hours worked weekly, full-time 
or part-time worker, type of contract, workers of a private or public company, occupation (17 
categories) and regional dummies (18 regions, Eurostat Nuts 2 level). After estimating the male 
partner’s earnings, we group this variable into six categories8. 
Two binary variables indicate if the male partner has time restrictions for household 
production: a dummy indicating whether the male partner has lengthy working hours (more than 
40 hours per week) and another dummy indicating if he works outside the region of residence 
(52 regions, Eurostat Nuts level 3).  
 
 
                                                 
7 If we were to consider all the reasons for being out of the labor market, our subsample would comprise 29,740 women (206 
additional women). This implies that 0.69% of employed women at t-1 are out of the labor market in t for reasons other than 
household production (studying, retired, disability, being a pensioner and others). As a check of robustness we have also estimated 
the model considering all possible reasons for being out of the labor force. The results are in line with those presented in this paper 
(see Appendix 2). 
8 To control for the potential distortions of this approach on the estimated coefficients, we also estimate the probability of labor 
market withdrawal by including variables which proxy the male partner’s earnings. The results are available upon request from the 
corresponding author. 
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Table 1. Variables and definitions 
 Variable definition 
Personal characteristics (t) Age (5 dummies) 
 20-24 
 25-29 
 30-34 
 35-39 
 40-44 
 Educational attainment (3 dummies) 
 Primary or less 
 Secondary  
 Tertiary  
 
Newborn (t) Have a newborn baby (dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a child under 
12 months in the reference week of the survey) 
 
Household characteristics (t) Other children  
 Youngest child aged 1-2 (dummy variable equal to 1 if the youngest child is aged 1 
to 2 years old) 
 Youngest child aged 3-5 (dummy variable equal to 1 if the youngest child is aged 3 
to 5 years old) 
 Youngest child aged >=6 (dummy variable equal to 1 if the youngest child is aged 
6 years old and over) 
 No children (dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has no children) 
 Married couple (dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married) 
 
 Grandparents in the household (dummy variable equal to 1 if there are 
grandparents living in the household) 
 
Partner’s job characteristics (t) Estimated earnings (6 dummies) 
  < €15,000 
 €15,000-€25,000  
 €25,000-€35,000 
 €35,000-€45,000 
 €45,000-€60,000  
 >  €60,000 
 Restrictions on time to dedicate to household production  
 Long working hours (dummy variable equal to 1 if the husband has long working 
hours) 
 Working in another region (dummy variable equal to 1 if the husband works in a 
region other than that of residence) 
 
Women’s job characteristics  (t-1) Occupation (4 dummies) 
 High earnings 
 Moderate earnings 
 Low earnings 
 Very low earnings 
 Class of worker (3 dummies) 
 Private sector workers  
 Public sector workers 
 Non-employees  
 Industry (4 dummies)  
 Agriculture 
 Manufacturing 
 Construction 
 Services  
 Job security: 
 Seniority (years of seniority in the firm) 
 Regional rate of jobs with fixed-term contracts for women aged 20-44 (52 regions, 
percentage) 
 Regional unemployment rate for women aged 20-44 (52 regions, percentage) 
 
Childcare services (t)  Regional rate of public and private kindergarten places for children aged 0-2 
(percentage) 
 
 
 
Regarding women’s job characteristics we include occupation (4 categories), class of 
worker (non-employees, public and private workers), industry (4 categories) and several 
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variables related to job security, all of which refer to the previous year (t-1). Following a similar 
procedure9 to the one proposed by Gutiérrez- Domènech (2005), we have classified occupation 
into four categories attending to the estimated earnings (high, moderate, low and very low). As 
regards job security variables, the empirical literature has shown that the type of contract is a 
very relevant variable in explaining withdrawal from the labor force. Nevertheless, type of 
contract is not included among the retrospective variables of the survey. Since the rate of 
permanent contracts grows exponentially with seniority, we use seniority10 to proxy stable 
connection to employment, and hence job security. Regional rate of jobs with fixed-term 
contracts and regional unemployment rate are also included among the variables related to job 
security. Both variables are measured at the regional level (52 regions) for women aged 20-44.  
Finally, as Baizán (2009), we measure the coverage ratio of childcare services in the 
place of residence as the ratio of total (public and private) kindergarten places for children aged 
0-2 over the total number of children aged 0-2 in the region of residence (52 regions). 
 
3. Descriptive analysis  
 
In this section we explore the job withdrawal ratio among the different variables, 
focusing on the effect that having a newborn has on this ratio. The results are provided in Table 
2, where columns 1 and 2 also show the main characteristics of the sample. Starting with these 
characteristics and as can be seen, 7.5% of the women in our sample have a newborn baby 
(2,202 women), another 70.7% have children over the age of twelve months, and the remaining 
21.8% are childless. The majority of the women are married and have tertiary studies, while a 
large number have only primary studies. Regarding male’s job characteristics, the majority of 
the women’s partners earn an estimated salary of €15,000-€25,000 euros, while only 15% of 
them earn more than €35,000. As regards the male partner’s time restrictions it is worth noting 
that one out of four works more than forty hours a week, while only 3% works in a province 
other than that of residence. In terms of women’s job characteristics, most of them work as 
employees: 58% in the private sector and another 27% in the public sector. Nearly 40% of 
women have less than three years of seniority and the majority of them work in low or very low 
paid occupations. Finally, one out of three women lives in a region where the rate of 
kindergarten places is lower than 5%. 
                                                 
9 Using microdata from the EES, we have estimated a wage equation for women aged 20 to 44. As covariates, the regression 
includes age, age squared, educational attainment, seniority in the firm, type of contract, and regional and occupation dummies. 
Using the estimated wage, we grouped the 66 occupations into four categories from “high earnings” to “very low earnings”. We 
have used the classification derived from this procedure to group woman’s occupation in t-1 in the EPA. See Appendix 3 for a 
detailed description of the classification.  
10 For those women that were working at t-1 and continue working in t but in a different company (3% of the entire sample), we do 
not know their exact seniority in the previous firm. In these cases we have used their seniority in t as their value for t-1. This could 
imply that for these women, seniority could be under-measured. As the majority of workers who change companies are workers 
with short periods of seniority and also very high rates of temporary contracts, the potential under-measurement is very slight. 
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Focusing now on the job withdrawal ratio (JWR hereafter), we have defined the JWR as 
the percentage of women who being employed in t-1 have withdrawn from the labor market and 
are therefore out of the labor force in t. Columns 3 to 6 in Table 2 provide information on this 
JWR, which is close to 6% for the entire sample. The last column shows the relative ratio 
between the JWR for women with a newborn baby and childless women. As we can see, the 
JWR is 19.2% for women with newborns. This is almost 5 times higher than the JWR for 
childless women and nearly 4 times higher than mothers with children over one year old.  
Examining this JWR along the different characteristics, we can observe in all cases that 
having a newborn significantly increases the percentage of women that withdraw from the labor 
market after having a child, but the intensity of the effect depends on the observed 
characteristics. In addition to the well-known effects that personal characteristics have on 
women’s labor market decisions (the JWR decreases with age and education), other variables 
play a relevant role in women’s decisions to leave the labor market.  
Starting with the male partners’ job characteristics, the descriptive analysis suggests an 
inverse relationship between the female JWR and male earnings. This effect is clear for the 
lowest-paid groups for which the female withdrawal ratio is over 10% and falls to around 4% 
for the rest of cases. Once more the JWR grows significantly when there is a newborn: in this 
case women whose partners have a low income display a JWR close to 30%, which falls to 
15%-20% for other wage groups. A priori, these figures contrast with the general finding in the 
economic literature of a negative relationship between male partners’ earnings and women’s 
labor market participation. As we will explain below in section 5, several explanations could 
support this inverse relation. One possible argument is that if the husband’s wages are high, the 
family income will increase and they will be more likely to pay for external childcare services 
and, as a consequence, women will not need to leave the labor market after childbirth. 
In addition, the figures suggest that if husbands (or partners) have restrictions on the 
time they can dedicate to housework, this will affect women’s decisions to leave the labor 
market. In general terms, withdrawal increases if the male partner works more than 40 hours per 
week or if he works in a province other than the one of residence. If they have a newborn, data 
show that women whose husbands have long working hours have a JWR which is 9 percentage 
points higher than women whose partners work less than 40 hours a week. This difference is 
especially relevant if we take into account that around one out of four of households in the 
sample are in this situation. If the husband works outside the region of residence, having a 
newborn increases the JWR to nearly 26%. Once more, the figures are important, although this 
characteristic only affects 3% of households. In any case, when focusing on the relative JWR, 
the effect of childbirth seems to be higher if the husband has long working hours than if he is 
working in another province.  
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Table 2. Sample characteristics and job withdrawal ratio 
 Sample Job Withdrawal Ratio (JWR), percentages Relative  
 No. obs % Total Newborn Children No  JWR  
     > 12 months  children (4) / (6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TOTAL 29,534 100.0 5.8 19.2 4.9 4.0 4.8 
Personal characteristics       
Women's age: 20-24 614 2.1 12.7 50.0 15.7 6.6 7.6 
25-29 3,411 11.5 9.7 30.9 11.7 4.9 6.3 
30-34 7,206 24.4 7.3 18.2 6.5 3.6 5.1 
35-39 8,922 30.2 5.0 10.9 4.8 2.9 3.8 
40-44 9,381 31.8 3.5 11.7 3.5 2.2 5.3 
Women’s education: Primary or less 10,935 37.0 9.6 36.6 8.0 9.1 4.0 
Secondary  6,779 23.0 5.0 19.3 3.8 3.9 4.9 
Tertiary  11,820 40.0 2.7 10.4 2.0 1.5 6.9 
Household characteristics      
No children 6,447 21.8 4.0 - - 4.0 - 
Newborn  2,202 7.5 19.2 19.2 - - - 
Youngest child aged 1-2 3,586 12.1 5.9 - 5.9 - - 
Youngest child aged 3-5 4,659 15.8 5.1 - 5.1 - - 
Youngest child aged >=6 12,640 42.8 4.5 - 4.5 - - 
Married  27,436 92.9 5.8 18.5 4.8 4.4 4.2 
Non-married 2,098 7.1 5.3 31.2 7.1 2.7 11.6 
Grandparents in the household 846 2.9 5.0 11.5 4.7 5.1 2.3 
No grandparents 28,688 97.1 5.8 19.3 4.9 4.0 4.8 
Male partner’s job characteristics (t)      
Partner’s estimated earnings: < €15,000 5,506 18.6 10.1 28.6 9.4 6.4 4.5 
€15,000-€25,000  13,677 46.3 5.3 16.5 4.7 3.2 5.2 
€25,000-€35,000 6,013 20.4 4.1 15.8 3.4 2.8 5.6 
€35,000-€45,000 2,158 7.3 3.8 15.5 3.0 3.3 4.7 
€45,000-€60,000  1,279 4.3 4.1 22.7 3.3 1.8 12.6 
>  €60,000 901 3.1 4.4 20.9 3.8 2.3 9.1 
Husband working more than 40 hours/week 7,929 26.8 6.8 26.1 5.5 4.6 5.7 
Husband working less than 40 hours/week 21,605 73.2 5.4 16.8 4.7 3.8 4.4 
Husband working in another province 871 2.9 7.9 25.7 6.4 6.2 4.1 
Husband working in the same province 28,663 97.1 5.7 18.9 4.8 3.9 4.8 
Woman’s job characteristics (t-1)      
High earnings occupation 3565 12.1 1.5 4.3 1.3 0.6 6.8 
Moderate earnings occupation 8080 27.4 2.7 8.7 2.3 1.8 4.9 
Low earnings occupation 9159 31.0 6.2 23.4 4.8 4.6 5.1 
Very low earnings occupation 8730 29.6 9.9 36.4 8.3 7.9 4.6 
Class of worker: Non-employees 4,649 15.7 4.3 13.1 4.0 2.6 5.0 
Public sector workers 7,888 26.7 2.3 7.6 2.0 1.4 5.4 
Private sector workers 16,997 57.6 7.8 25.2 6.7 5.0 5.0 
Industry: Agriculture 940 3.2 10.9 44.2 9.0 11.1 4.0 
Manufacturing 3,582 12.1 8.2 25.8 6.9 6.5 4.0 
Construction 475 1.6 4.8 18.6 4.7 0.8 24.6 
Services 24,537 83.1 5.2 17.7 4.4 3.6 5.0 
Job security: Seniority: < 6 months 4,511 15.3 8.2 29.1 8.1 5.0 5.8 
6-12 months 1,775 6.0 19.8 46.7 20.6 8.9 5.2 
1-3 years 4,716 16.0 8.9 24.7 8.6 4.7 5.3 
3-10 years 9,269 31.4 4.0 13.5 3.2 2.3 5.9 
 10 years 9,263 31.4 2.1 9.9 1.5 3.0 3.3 
Job security: % of fixed-term contracts:  < 30% 4,884 16.5 2.8 13.1 2.3 1.1 11.9 
30% to 50% 20,365 69.0 5.8 19.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 
 50% 4,285 14.5 9.1 23.0 8.3 5.9 3.9 
Job security: Unemployment rate: < 10% 6,019 20.4 5.2 19.9 4.3 3.3 6.0 
10% to 15% 8,812 29.8 4.8 16.1 4.1 3.3 4.9 
15% to 25% 10,709 36.3 6.1 19.7 5.1 4.6 4.3 
 25%  3,994 13.5 7.9 22.6 6.7 5.9 3.8 
Childcare services       
Kindergarten places (0-2 years): < 5% 10,832 36.7 7.4 20.7 6.6 5.5 3.8 
5%-10% 5,873 19.9 5.8 22.2 4.5 4.5 4.9 
10%-25% 6,760 22.9 4.9 16.9 4.1 3.8 4.4 
 25% 6,069 20.5 3.6 15.8 2.9 1.9 8.3 
Source: Spanish Labor Force Survey for principal calculations and Ministry of Education for kindergarten places 
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Other variables seem to have a relevant effect on women’s labor market withdrawals. 
The data on women’s job characteristics show an inverse relation between wages (proxied by 
occupation) and labor market withdrawal, which can be explained by the higher opportunity 
cost of leaving the labor market for those women with high wages. As in the other cases, the 
JWR increases significantly when there is a newborn, and is higher than 36% for women 
working in very low paid jobs. Nevertheless, when we compare women with newborns to 
childless women the JWR increases in a relevant manner (almost 7 times higher even when the 
women work in a high paid job). Concerning the class of worker, and consistently with the 
feature that public sector working conditions are more compatible with childbearing, we 
observe that public sector workers display the lowest JWR. For women with newborns, the 
difference between private and public sector workers is far greater: over 25% for the former and 
less than 8% for the latter. Considering seniority, women with less than one year of seniority 
have the highest JWR, although it is also high for women whose seniority is between one and 
three years11. This is consistent with what we would expect as lesser seniority is related to a lack 
of job security and, consequently, higher unemployment risk. In all cases, the JWR increases 
significantly for women with a newborn, especially for shorter periods of seniority.  
Finally, we can also see that job withdrawal falls as the ratio of regional kindergarten 
places increases, thus suggesting that a higher provision of childcare services could allow 
women to remain employed and better combine paid work and family. 
To summarize, the descriptive analysis presented here shows that having a newborn 
baby greatly increases the percentage of women that leave their jobs after childbirth. Apart from 
women’s personal characteristics, the figures suggest that husbands’ job characteristics have a 
non-negligible effect on women’s decisions to leave the labor market. Specifically, women 
appear to be less likely to leave their jobs if their husbands’ earnings are high, probably because 
this would allow them to buy external childcare services. On the other hand, if their husbands 
work long hours or if they work outside the region of residence, their wives will also be more 
likely to leave their jobs. The effects of women’s job characteristics are the expected ones as 
higher wages or better working conditions reduce the job withdrawal ratio. In addition, the 
greater availability of childcare places appears to reduce the job withdrawal ratio. 
 
                                                 
11 During the period of analysis the maximum duration of a fixed-term contract in the Spanish legislation was three years. 
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4. Econometric approach 
 
The empirical model we estimate in this section establishes that a woman’s decision to 
leave the labor market depends on observed individual characteristics, having or not a newborn  
and other household composition variables. From a household perspective and taking into 
account the relevant effect that the male partner’s job characteristics could have on females’ 
labor market decisions, the model also considers husband’s earnings and variables related to 
restrictions on the time they can dedicate to household production as covariates. Finally, 
woman’s job characteristics (especially those associated to job security and working conditions) 
and the availability of childcare services are included as explanatory variables.  
In particular, the female decision to withdraw from the labor market is defined by the 
latent variable  Ji* as:  
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*         [1.] 
 
where Vi is the row vector of personal characteristics, Bi is the variable indicating if the 
female has a newborn in period t, Hi comprises factors regarding household composition, Pi is 
the vector including the male partner’s job characteristics and Ei the ones related to a woman’s 
job characteristics at t-1. Finally, Ci denotes the availability of childcare services and i1  is an 
error term. 
We define the indicator variable as Ji=1 if the latent variable Ji* >0 for cases in which 
an employed woman in t-1 is out of the labor force (due to household production reasons) in 
period t, and as Ji=0 if she remains employed. In such cases we estimate 
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i
V
ii CEPHBVJ   )1Pr( , where the parameter B  measures the 
effect of childbirth on this transition from employment to out of the labor force. 
As having a baby is not an exogenous decision, in order to control for the potential 
endogeneity of the variable Bi, the empirical model includes another specification for the 
childbirth  decision. As in standard models of fertility, the explanatory factors included in the 
equation for the maternity decision comprise personal, household characteristics and male 
partner’s earnings. However, as we pointed out in the introduction, there exists empirical 
evidence about other variables affecting childbirth decisions. Thus, the specification of a 
woman’s decision to have a baby also includes other covariates related to job security as well as 
other woman’s job characteristics and the availability of childcare services. Finally, the 
specification for the maternity decision also includes other job aspects of the male partners.  
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Thus, the childbirth decision is defined by the latent variable  Bi* as:  
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*        [2.] 
 
where Vi, Hi, Pi, Ei and Ci are the vectors of the variables explained above and i2  is an 
error term. 
Regarding equation [2] we define the indicator variable as Bi=1 if the latent variable 
Bi*>0 when a woman i has a newborn baby in the reference week of the survey and Bi=0 
otherwise. Then, for the decision to have a child we estimate 
C
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As the labor market withdrawal decision and the maternity decision are interrelated, we 
assume that both 1i and 2i are identically distributed as a standard bivariate normal distribution 
with correlation . This correlation reflects the interrelations between labor market participation 
decisions and childbirth decisions. As the two error terms 1i and 2i are correlated, we estimate 
the joint probability of labor market withdrawal and childbirth by equation [3]: 
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where F is the bivariate normal distribution function with zero means, unit variance 
and correlation .  
 
5. Results  
 
In this section we discuss the results of the joint estimation of the female job withdrawal 
decision and the maternity decision expressed by equation 3. These results are given in Table 3. 
For each equation, the first two columns report the regression coefficients and their robust 
standard errors. The rest of the table details the marginal effects calculated for the univariate 
predicted probability of deciding to leave the labor market [Pr(Ji=1), column 3] and of deciding 
to have a child [Pr(Bi=1), column 6]. The last column of the table shows the marginal effects 
calculated for the predicted conditional probability of labor market withdrawal, which is, in fact, 
the probability we are interested in [Pr (Ji=1 | Bi=1)]. 
In general terms, the econometric results point in the same direction as the descriptive 
analysis. Even after controlling for other observed variables affecting women’s decisions to 
leave the labor market, having a newborn significantly increases the probability that a woman 
will decide to leave her job. While the descriptive analysis showed that childbirth increased the 
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job withdrawal ratio, the econometric results show that, once we take into account other factors, 
the difference in the probability between women who have a newborn and childless women 
remains positive and quite significant. As can be seen in Table 3 (columns 3 and 7), the 
estimated marginal probability of withdrawal is 6.2 percentage points higher for women with 
newborns than for childless women, and rises to about 10 percentage points if we consider the 
marginal effects on the conditional probability, thus reinforcing the convenience of considering 
the endogeneity of having a baby. These results are consistent with previous studies of the 
Spanish female labor supply. For example, De la Rica and Ferrero (2003) find that female labor 
participation is lower for women with newborns, but the effect is much higher when they take 
into account the endogeneity of the fertility variable. In addition, women with children over one 
year old are also more likely to leave their jobs. Furthermore, it can be seen that the younger the 
child, the more likely women are to withdraw from labor force. Regarding the childbirth 
decision, as expected, the existence of other children in the household has a negative and highly 
significant effect on the probability of giving birth, and is stronger as the number of other 
children increases. 
Concerning the other factors surrounding both probabilities and for expositional 
purposes, we first describe the main findings related to husbands’ job characteristics and then 
those referred to the women’s job characteristics as well as childcare services. Finally, we 
briefly discuss the effects of the other variables.   
In line with the descriptive analysis, the results confirm that male partners’ earnings 
have a negative effect on female labor market withdrawal. This result contrasts with Mincer 
(1962), who postulated that the higher the male partner’s income, the more likely the wife 
would be to withdraw from her job after childbirth. Two possible explanations can account for 
the inverse relation we observe between male wages and female participation. On the one hand, 
if the husband’s wages are high, the household income will increase and they will be more 
likely to pay for external childcare services. Consequently, women will not need to leave the 
labor market as the household childcare needs can be covered by means of paid external help.  
On the other hand, an alternative explanation could follow from the assortative mating 
theory. As women and men are matched positively in couples, women in couple with men who 
earn more are also likely to earn more, making women more prone to remain in the labor market 
after childbirth. Focusing on the specific estimated marginal effects and taking as the reference 
category households with the lowest estimated income, the estimations show that for all other 
income groups women are less likely to withdraw, although the difference is only significant for 
partners with an estimated salary lower than €25,000.  
With respect to the maternity decision, the effect of husbands’ labor income shows a 
positive effect on the maternity decision. This is in line with the theoretical and empirical 
literature as having a child is a costly decision and, all else being equal, a higher income would 
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allow families to have more children. Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient is only significant 
for earnings under €45,000. 
A noteworthy result is that male partners’ working conditions have a very significant 
effect on women’s decisions to withdraw from the labor market. Our empirical results show that 
male partners’ working conditions have an important and highly significant effect on the 
probability of the female partner leaving the labor market as these working conditions determine 
the amount of time that male partners can dedicate to childcare and housework. Obviously, the 
time that husbands spend on childcare depends on their preferences, but also on their job 
characteristics. As we stated earlier, our analysis focuses on the time that male partners cannot 
dedicate to childcare due to family-unfriendly jobs.  
Specifically, the econometric results indicate that if the male partner has long working 
hours, the probability of the wife withdrawing increases by about 1.5 percentage points. This 
effect increases if he works outside the region of residence, as in this case his wife will be 4 
percentage points more likely to withdraw. These results reinforce the conviction that family 
policies must take into account not only working women, but also the male population as tough 
working conditions for men negatively affect women’s possibilities for reconciling work and 
family, thus prompting women to quit their jobs. Nonetheless, neither a husband with long 
working hours nor one working in another region has a significant effect on maternity decisions.   
As concerns women’s job characteristics and consistently with the higher opportunity 
cost of leaving the labor market when earning high wages, the probability of withdrawal is 
lower as the wage increases, and is very significant for all the occupational groups. The class of 
worker has an important and strongly significant effect on the probability of labor market 
withdrawal. Compared to private sector workers, public sector and non-employees are less 
likely to withdraw. The marginal effect in the conditional case for both of them is 3.1 
percentage points over the reference group. This could be related to better working conditions in 
the public sector such as more flexible hours, which make it easier for people to combine work 
and family (see, for instance, Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2010). For the same reason, we would 
expect that women working in the public sector would be more likely to have a newborn. 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the estimated coefficient is positive, it does not appear to 
have a significant effect on childbirth decisions. This finding is similar to that of Esping-
Andersen et al. (2007) when determining the likelihood of second births. 
As regards factors related to job security, our results point out, as expected, that higher 
levels of job security reduce the probability of leaving the labor market and increase the 
probability of having a child. Specifically, seniority in the firm has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of job quitting. The estimated marginal effect conditional to having a child predicts 
that a woman with five additional years of seniority will reduce her probability of labor dropout 
by 3.5 percentage points. In addition, higher levels of job security (longer periods of seniority) 
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improve individuals’ confidence about their future income, thus increasing the probability of 
having a baby, which is in line with the results of De la Rica and Iza (2005) as well as Ahn and 
Mira (2001). In the same vein, living in a region with a high percentage of fixed-term contracts 
increases the probability of job withdrawal. On the other hand, a high unemployment rate 
reduces the probability of women’s labor market withdrawal. A possible explanation for this 
feature is that when the unemployment rate is high, women know that if they leave their jobs it 
will be more difficult to return to the labor market. This is a relevant issue as it indicates that in 
many cases the labor market withdrawals that we are observing are not permanent. In this sense, 
family policies such as maternity leave appear to be an accurate measure to allow temporary 
withdrawals and ensure labor market re-entry. In contrast, we do not find that the quantity of 
fixed-term contracts or the unemployment rate have any effect on the probability of having a 
child. This coincides with the results of Ahn and Mira (2001), who find that the increase in the 
Spanish unemployment rate has had a negative effect on age at marriage, but a much lower 
effect on the probability of maternity. 
Concerning the regional provision of childcare services, our empirical estimations show 
that a higher provision of childcare services decreases the likelihood of job withdrawal. Similar 
results have been obtained by Del Boca et al. (2009) for a panel of European countries. In our 
estimations, the effect is only significant if the percentage of kindergarten places is over 10%. 
These results could have important implications: increasing the number of kindergarten places 
seems to be an effective measure, but only if it achieves a minimum rate, which we have 
estimated at around 10%. Nonetheless, the marginal effect for regions with 10%-25% and 25% 
and over compared to the reference category is approximately the same, thus suggesting that a 
more than 25% increase in the provision of childcare services will not reduce female labor 
market withdrawal. On the subject of how the availability of childcare services could affect the 
probability of having a child, similar to Del Boca et al. (2009) but contrary to Baizán (2009), we 
do not find a significant effect.  
Focusing on the rest of the variables, the results regarding the effects of age and 
education are consistent with the well-known effects from previous literature (see, for instance, 
Dex et al., 1998 and Gutiérrez-Domènech, 2005). The probability of withdrawing from the labor 
market is reduced with age and education due to the higher opportunity cost of labor market 
withdrawal since human capital accumulates with both age (labor experience) and educational 
attainment.  
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Table 3. Joint estimation of women’s job withdrawal decision and maternity decision 
(bivariate probit model) 
 JOB WITHDRAWAL DECISION (Ji = 1) 
MATERNITY DECISION  
(Bi =1) Marginal 
effects (c) 
p (Ji=1 | Bi=1)
  
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Ji=1) 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Bi=1) 
 Coef. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (Hi)     
No children (ref.)     
Having a newborn (Bi) 0.49 (0.167) *** 0.062 - -  - 0.104 
Youngest child aged 1-2 0.26 (0.054) *** 0.027 - -  - 0.048 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.14 (0.053) *** 0.013 - -  - 0.023 
Youngest child aged >=6 0.07 (0.051)  0.006 - -  - 0.011 
Number of children: 1 - -  - -0.22 (0.029) *** -0.049 0.007 
Number of children: 2 - -  - -1.08 (0.043) *** -0.147 0.044 
Number of children: 3 or more - -  - -1.01 (0.085) *** -0.144 0.041 
Married 0.13 (0.059) ** 0.010 0.53 (0.054) *** 0.100 0.003 
Grandparents in the household 0.03 (0.083)  0.003 - -  - 0.005 
MALE PARTNER'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t (Pi)     
Partner’s estimated earnings: < €15,000 (ref.)     
€15,000-25,000  -0.11 (0.033) *** -0.010 0.01 (0.033)  0.004 -0.019 
€25,000-35,000 -0.03 (0.048)  -0.002 0.08 (0.045) * 0.021 -0.007 
€35,000-45,000 -0.07 (0.068)  -0.005 0.14 (0.060) ** 0.037 -0.013 
€45,000-60,000  -0.09 (0.082)  -0.007 0.01 (0.078)  0.003 -0.013 
< €60,000 -0.07 (0.094)  -0.005 0.08 (0.093)  0.021 -0.012 
Husband working in another province 0.22 (0.071) *** 0.022 -0.04 (0.070)  -0.009 0.040 
Husband working more than 40 hours/week 0.09 (0.034) *** 0.008 -0.03 (0.033)  -0.008 0.015 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Vi)     
Women's age: 25-29 (ref.)     
20-24 0.02 (0.075)  0.001 0.04 (0.077)  0.011 0.001 
30-34 -0.06 (0.043)  -0.005 0.20 (0.036) *** 0.053 -0.014 
35-39 -0.14 (0.047) *** -0.010 -0.01 (0.043)  -0.003 -0.018 
40-44 -0.23 (0.056) *** -0.016 -0.72 (0.058) *** -0.121 -0.011 
Women’s education: Secondary  (ref.)     
Primary studies 0.24 (0.035) *** 0.024 -0.03 (0.035)  -0.009 0.044 
Tertiary studies -0.14 (0.043) *** -0.010 0.07 (0.033) ** 0.018 -0.021 
WOMAN'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t-1 (Ei)     
Occupation classification: Very low earnings (ref.)     
High earnings -0.55 (0.072) *** -0.028 0.13 (0.048) *** 0.034 -0.057 
Moderate earnings -0.33 (0.043) *** -0.020 0.04 (0.038)  0.009 -0.040 
Low earnings -0.16 (0.031) *** -0.015 0.03 (0.033)  0.006 -0.028 
Professional status: Private sector employee (ref.)     
Employer/Self-employed -0.14 (0.042) *** -0.010 -0.03 (0.040)  -0.008 -0.019 
Public sector employee -0.24 (0.042) *** -0.016 0.04 (0.032)  0.010 -0.031 
Job security     
   Years of seniority in firm -0.05 (0.003) *** -0.004 0.01 (0.002) ** 0.001 -0.007 
   Percentage of fixed-term contracts (a) 0.01 (0.002) *** 0.001 0.00 (0.002)  0.000 0.002 
   Unemployment rate (%) (b) -0.01 (0.003) ** -0.001 0.00 (0.003)  0.000 -0.001 
CHILDCARE SERVICES (Ci)     
0-2 years Kindergarten places: Less than 5% (ref.)     
5% to < 10% -0.08 (0.069)  -0.006 0.02 (0.069)  0.006 -0.013 
10% to < 25% -0.19 (0.081) ** -0.019 -0.07 (0.078)  -0.017 -0.031 
25% and more -0.24 (0.103) ** -0.016 -0.07 (0.095)  -0.017 -0.029 
         Rho 0.27       
Number of observations 29,534       
Wald test of rho=0: chi2 =  9.71398    Prob > chi2 = 0.0018           Log pseudolikelihood = -12001.038    
*Statistically significant at the .10 level  **at the .05 level  ***at the .01 level 
The regressions include a constant term, 3 dummies for industry, 16 regional dummies and 3 dummies for period.  
(a) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) for women aged 20-44 
(b) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) from Ministry of Education (www.mec.es)  
(c) Reference group in the marginal effects calculations: No children, married, no grandparents in the household, partner’s estimated earnings €15,000-
€25,000, partner working in the same province of residence and under 40 hours per week, 25-29 years old, secondary studies, low-income occupation, 
private sector employee, working in service sector, 7.4 years of seniority in the firm (mean), living in a region (Nuts3) with 40% fixed-term contracts 
and an unemployment rate of 16%, living in a region (Nuts3) with a 10%-25% ratio of 0-2 year kindergarten places. The reference region (Nuts2) and 
period of reference are Andalusia and 2001, respectively.  
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Concerning the probability of having a child, our data show a positive effect of age for 
women under 35. This is in line with the postponement of marriage and maternity observed in 
most advanced economies, which is mainly explained by the increase in female labor force 
participation12. Regarding education, our estimations show an interesting result as women with 
higher levels of education appear to be more likely to have a child. Although this result 
contrasts with the traditional inverse relationship between education and fertility, it points in the 
same direction as some recent empirical evidence which claims that this relationship has 
become positive in several countries13. For instance, Baizán (2009) finds that women with a low 
educational level have significantly higher rates of first birth, while the effect is exactly the 
opposite for second and higher-order births.  
Finally, being married has a small positive effect on the probability of leaving the labor 
market, while the stability of the couple represented by marriage has a clearly positive and 
highly significant effect on the childbirth decision14. Despite the results of Alba-Ramirez and 
Alvarez-Llorente (2004) concerning the presence of grandparents in the household, we do not 
find that this has a significant effect on the probability of job withdrawal. This non-significance 
could be related to the reduction in the percentage of grandparents cohabiting with their 
families, but also to the fact that we cannot consider whether there are grandparents living near 
the household but not in it.  
Summing up, the analysis of the factors surrounding the decision of a woman to leave 
the labor market show that having a newborn continues to exert a clearly negative effect on 
women’s employment situation, as women with newborns are much more likely to withdraw 
from the labor market. Several factors, such as the woman’s personal and job characteristics, 
have a significant effect on this decision. In addition, once we control for all these factors, we 
find empirical evidence that the male partner’s job characteristics have a significant effect on 
women’s labor market decisions, especially if the husband has long working hours or if he 
works in a region different than the one of residence. If women’s labor market decisions are 
affected by the non family-friendly working conditions of their partners, measures aimed at 
reconciling work and family should take account of both women and men. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Other authors, such as Oreffice (2007), have also highlighted the delay and reduction of fertility caused by birth control 
technologies and abortion laws. 
13 See Esping-Andersen et al. (2007), Kögel (2004) and Ahn and Mira (2002) for a review of the change in the relationship between 
fertility and education. 
14 We also have estimated the model for the subsample of married women and the results are very similar (see Appendix 1). Due to 
the lack of observations, we have not estimated the model for the subsample of non-married women. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyze the effect of childbirth on the probability that a woman will 
decide to leave the labor market in Spain. We use pooled, cross-sectional microdata for the 
period 2001-2004 drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. In particular, we analyze the 
effect of having a child on the transition from employment to out of the labor force due to 
housework reasons since this transition is the only type which can be related strictly to 
difficulties in reconciling work and family. We pay special attention to the effect of the male 
partner’s characteristics on withdrawal decisions. As childbirth is not an exogenous decision, we 
jointly estimate the probability of job withdrawal and the probability of giving birth using a 
bivariate probit model. 
Our first result is that despite recent improvements in the availability of facilities for 
women to reconcile work and family, having a newborn continues to have a negative and very 
significant effect on women’s labor market decisions.  
Among the factors affecting this decision, the male partner’s job characteristics have a 
relevant effect on women’s employment decisions. First, the empirical results show, in general 
terms, a negative relationship between husbands’ income and women’s probability of job 
quitting. This suggests that if the household income is high enough to afford the market price of 
childcare services, women will decide to continue in the labor market after childbirth. Another 
possible explanation is that as women and men are matched positively in couples, women in 
couple with men who earn more are also likely to earn more, thus increasing their opportunity 
cost of leaving the labor market.  
Second, and as a confirmation of the interdependence of the labor supply decisions of 
household members, the results show an empirical connection between the time that male 
partners can dedicate to childcare and women’s decisions to withdraw from the labor market. 
All other things equal, the results show that if the male partner works long hours or if he works 
outside the region of residence, his female partner will be more likely to leave the labor market. 
Attending to this result, family policies should focus greater attention on male working 
conditions.  
As other authors have pointed out, women’s job characteristics proved to be highly 
relevant and significant in determining the probability of job withdrawal. Women working in 
high paid jobs or in a family-friendly environment such as the public sector will be less likely to 
withdraw from the labor market since public sector employees in Spain are well protected and 
benefit strongly from reconciliation policies. Job security is another relevant issue for female 
workers. According to other studies, our empirical results show that women with longer periods 
of seniority, who are also more likely to have a permanent contract, have a lower probability of 
job withdrawal.   
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Finally, the estimations show that the availability of childcare services has a negative 
and significant effect on the probability of female labor market withdrawal. Nevertheless, the 
results we obtained suggest that increasing the availability of kindergarten places is not an 
accurate measure in all cases. Specifically, our results suggest that the effect on the probability 
of job withdrawal is only significant when the percentage of kindergarten places increases to 
10%, but increasing the places above 25% does not lead to additional reductions in the 
probability of job withdrawal. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 4. Joint estimation of women’s job withdrawal decision and maternity decision 
(bivariate probit model), Married Women 
 JOB WITHDRAWAL DECISION (Ji = 1) 
MATERNITY DECISION  
(Bi =1) Marginal 
effects (c) 
p (Ji=1 | Bi=1)
  
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Ji=1) 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Bi=1) 
 Coef. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (Hi)          
No children (ref.)          
Having a newborn (Bi) 0.474 (0.185) *** 0.059 - -  - 0.096 
Youngest child aged 1-2 0.226 (0.056) *** 0.023 - -  - 0.039 
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.111 (0.055) ** 0.010 - -  - 0.018 
Youngest child aged >=6 0.032 (0.053)  0.003 - -  - 0.005 
Number of children: 1 - -  - -0.236 (0.030) *** -0.054 0.007 
Number of children: 2 - -  - -1.123 (0.044) *** -0.156 0.041 
Number of children: 3 or more - -  - -1.029 (0.086) *** -0.151 0.037 
Married - -  - - -  - - 
Grandparents in the Household 0.036 (0.084)  0.003 - -  - 0.005 
MALE PARTNER'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t (Pi)      
Partner’s estimated earnings: < €15,000 (ref.)      
€15,000-25,000  -0.118 (0.035) *** -0.011 0.008 (0.035)  0.002 -0.019 
€25,000-35,000 -0.037 (0.049)  -0.003 0.077 (0.047)  0.021 -0.007 
€35,000-45,000 -0.087 (0.071)  -0.007 0.121 (0.063) * 0.033 -0.015 
€45,000-60,000  -0.077 (0.085)  -0.006 0.008 (0.081)  0.002 -0.011 
< €60,000 -0.057 (0.096)  -0.005 0.070 (0.097)  0.019 -0.010 
Husband working in another province 0.219 (0.073) *** 0.022 -0.029 (0.071)  -0.007 0.039 
Husband working more than 40 hours/ week 0.091 (0.036) ** 0.008 -0.041 (0.034)  -0.010 0.016 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Vi)      
Women's age: 25-29 (ref.)      
20-24 0.075 (0.088)  0.007 0.094 (0.088)  0.025 0.009 
30-34 -0.076 (0.045) * -0.006 0.191 (0.038) *** 0.054 -0.015 
35-39 -0.157 (0.049) *** -0.011 -0.020 (0.044)  -0.005 -0.020 
40-44 -0.236 (0.059) *** -0.016 -0.738 (0.060) *** -0.129 -0.012 
Women’s education: Secondary  (ref.)      
Primary studies 0.247 (0.037) *** 0.026 -0.055 (0.036)  -0.014 0.045 
Tertiary studies -0.121 (0.045) *** -0.009 0.086 (0.035) ** 0.023 -0.018 
WOMAN'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t-1 (Ei)      
Occupation classification: Very low earnings (ref.)      
High earnings -0.546 (0.074) *** -0.028 0.141 (0.050) *** 0.039 -0.054 
Moderate earnings -0.334 (0.045) *** -0.021 0.030 (0.040)  0.008 -0.039 
Low earnings -0.147 (0.032) *** -0.014 0.032 (0.035)  0.008 -0.025 
Professional status: Private sector employee (ref.)      
Employer / Self-employed -0.144 (0.044) *** -0.011 -0.044 (0.042)  -0.011 -0.018 
Public sector employee -0.250 (0.043) *** -0.017 0.021 (0.034)  0.005 -0.031 
Job security      
   Years of seniority in firm -0.046 (0.003) *** -0.004 0.005 (0.003) ** 0.001 -0.007 
   Percentage of fixed-term contracts (a) 0.010 (0.002) *** 0.001 -0.002 (0.002)  0.000 0.002 
   Unemployment rate (%) (b) -0.010 (0.004) *** -0.001 0.002 (0.003)  0.000 -0.002 
CHILDCARE SERVICES (Ci)      
0-2 years Kindergarten places: Less than 5% (ref.)      
5% to < 10% -0.101 (0.071)  -0.008 0.037 (0.071)  0.010 -0.015 
10% to < 25% -0.228 (0.084) *** -0.023 -0.055 (0.081)  -0.015 -0.037 
25% and more -0.274 (0.106) *** -0.018 -0.058 (0.099)  -0.015 -0.032 
         Rho 0.254      
Number of observations 27,436      
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  6.85111    Prob > chi2 = 0.0089 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level  **at the .05 level  ***at the .01 level 
The regressions include a constant term and 3 dummies for industry, 16 regional dummies and 3 dummies for period  
(a) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) for women aged 20-44 
(b) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) from Ministry of Education (www.mec.es)  
(c) Reference group in the marginal effects calculations: No children, no grandparents in the household, partner’s estimated earnings €15,000-€25,000, 
partner working in the same province of residence and under 40 hours per week, 25-29 years old, secondary studies, low-income occupation, private 
sector employee, working in service sector, 7.4 years of seniority in the firm (mean), living in a region (Nuts3) with 40% fixed-term contracts and an 
unemployment rate of 16%, living in a region (Nuts3) with a 10%-25% ratio of 0-2 year kindergarten places. The reference region (Nuts2) and period 
of reference are Andalusia and 2001, respectively.  
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Appendix 2 
Table 5. Joint estimation of women’s job withdrawal decision and maternity decision 
(bivariate probit model). All Reasons of being out of the labor force 
 JOB WITHDRAWAL DECISION (Ji = 1) 
MATERNITY DECISION  
(Bi =1) Marginal 
effects (c) 
p (Ji=1 | Bi=1)
  
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Ji=1) 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Marginal 
effects 
(c) 
p (Bi=1) 
 Coef. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS (Hi)      
No children (ref.)     
Having a newborn (Bi) 0.463 (0.165) *** 0.063 - -  - 0.100
Youngest child aged 1-2 0.218 (0.051) *** 0.024 - -  - 0.041
Youngest child aged 3-5 0.092 (0.050) * 0.009 - -  - 0.016
Youngest child aged >=6 0.035 (0.048)  0.003 - -  - 0.006
Number of children: 1 - -  - -0.221 (0.029) *** -0.050 0.007
Number of children: 2 - -  - -1.079 (0.043) *** -0.149 0.042
Number of children: 3 or more - -  - -1.007 (0.084) *** -0.145 0.038
Married 0.131 (0.055) ** 0.011 0.529 (0.053) *** 0.101 0.004
Grandparents in the Household 0.014 (0.081)  0.001 - -  - 0.002
MALE PARTNER'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t (Pi)     
Partner’s estimated earnings: < €15,000 (ref.)     
€15,000-25,000  -0.103 (0.032) *** -0.010 0.014 (0.033)  0.004 -0.018
€25,000-35,000 -0.041 (0.046)  -0.004 0.077 (0.045) * 0.020 -0.009
€35,000-45,000 -0.039 (0.064)  -0.004 0.134 (0.060) ** 0.036 -0.010
€45,000-60,000  -0.053 (0.078)  -0.005 0.013 (0.077)  0.003 -0.009
< €60,000 -0.061 (0.090)  -0.005 0.077 (0.093)  0.020 -0.012
Husband working in another province 0.172 (0.069) ** 0.019 -0.038 (0.070)  -0.009 0.033
Husband working more than 40 hours/ week 0.088 (0.033) *** 0.009 -0.028 (0.032)  -0.007 0.016
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (Vi)     
Women's age: 25-29 (ref.)     
20-24 0.043 (0.072)  0.004 0.046 (0.076)  0.012 0.006
30-34 -0.045 (0.041)  -0.004 0.194 (0.036) *** 0.054 -0.012
35-39 -0.127 (0.045) *** -0.011 -0.007 (0.042)  -0.002 -0.018
40-44 -0.215 (0.054) *** -0.017 -0.720 (0.058) *** -0.123 -0.011
Women’s education: Secondary  (ref.)     
Primary studies 0.214 (0.034) *** 0.024 -0.038 (0.035)  -0.009 0.041
Tertiary studies -0.107 (0.040) *** -0.009 0.070 (0.033) ** 0.018 -0.018
WOMAN'S JOB CHARACTERISTICS t-1 (Ei)     
Occupation classification: Very low earnings (ref.)     
High earnings -0.533 (0.066) *** -0.032 0.132 (0.047) *** 0.036 -0.060
Moderate earnings -0.328 (0.041) *** -0.023 0.037 (0.038)  0.009 -0.042
Low earnings -0.150 (0.030) *** -0.016 0.027 (0.033)  0.007 -0.028
Professional status: Private sector employee (ref.)     
Employer / Self-employed -0.170 (0.041) *** -0.014 -0.039 (0.040)  -0.010 -0.023
Public sector employee -0.229 (0.039) *** -0.018 0.035 (0.032)  0.009 -0.032
Job security          
   Years of seniority in firm -0.046 (0.003) *** -0.004 0.005 (0.002) ** 0.001 -0.008
   Percentage of fixed-term contracts (a) 0.010 (0.002) *** 0.001 -0.002 (0.002)  0.000 0.002
   Unemployment rate (%) (b) -0.008 (0.003) ** -0.001 0.002 (0.003)  0.000 -0.001
CHILDCARE SERVICES (Ci)     
0-2 years Kindergarten places: Less than 5% (ref.)     
5% to < 10% -0.055 (0.067)  -0.005 0.027 (0.069)  0.007 -0.009
10% to < 25% -0.203 (0.078) *** -0.023 -0.062 (0.078)  -0.016 -0.035
25% and more -0.215 (0.098) ** -0.017 -0.068 (0.094)  -0.017 -0.028
         Rho 0.248       
Number of observations 29,740       
Wald test of rho=0: chi2 =  8.34324    Prob > chi2 = 0.0039           Log pseudolikelihood = -12647.589 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level  **at the .05 level  ***at the .01 level 
The regressions include a constant term, 3 dummies for industry, 16 regional dummies and 3 dummies for period  
(a) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) for women aged 20-44 
(b) Measured at regional level (provinces, Nuts3) from Ministry of Education (www.mec.es)  
(c) Reference group in the marginal effects calculations: No children, married, no grandparents in the household, partner’s estimated earnings €15,000-
€25,000, partner working in the same province of residence and under 40 hours per week, 25-29 years old, secondary studies, low-income occupation, 
private sector employee, working in service sector, 7.4 years of seniority in the firm (mean), living in a region (Nuts3) with 40% fixed-term contracts 
and an unemployment rate of 16%, living in a region (Nuts3) with a 10%-25% ratio of 0-2 year kindergarten places. The reference region (Nuts2) and 
period of reference are Andalusia and 2001, respectively.  
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Appendix 3 
Occupation classification for women 
 
OCCUPATIONS WITH HIGH EARNINGS  
10 Senior officials and legislators 23 Legal professionals 
11 Chief executives (>=10 employees) 24 Business and administration professionals 
12 Retail and wholesale trade managers (< 10 employees) 26 Science and engineering associate professionals 
14 Other services managers (< 10 employees) 27 Health associate professionals 
20 Science and engineering professionals 61 Skilled ranching workers 
21 Health professionals 70 Mining, manufacturing and construction supervisors 
OCCUPATIONS WITH MODERATE EARNINGS  
13 Hotel and restaurant managers (< 10 employees) 33 Finance and commercial support  professionals 
15 Retail and wholesale trade managers without employees 34 Other clerical support workers 
16 Hotel and restaurant managers without employees 40 Numerical and material recording clerks 
17 Other services managers without employees 63 Skilled fishery workers 
22 Teaching professionals 73 Sheet and structural metal supervisors 
25 Social and cultural professionals 75 Blacksmiths, toolmakers and related trades workers 
28 Teaching professionals with higher education 80 Stationary plant and machine supervisors 
29 Other associate professionals with higher education 82 Machine operators supervisors 
30 Science and engineering associate professionals  
OCCUPATIONS WITH LOW EARNINGS  
31 Health associate professionals 72 Building finishers, painters and related trades workers 
41 Librarians, archivists and curators 74 Workers in extractive industries 
42 Office machine operators 76 Machinery mechanics and repairers 
43 Other clerical support workers 77 Precision machinery mechanics, handicraft and printing trade workers 
44 Other clerical support workers 79 Wood working, garment and other craft and related trades workers 
45 Travel consultants and clerks 81 Stationary plant and machine operators 
46 Cashiers and ticket clerks 83 Machine operators 
52 Protective services workers 84 Assemblers 
53 Sales workers 85 Locomotive engine drivers and related workers 
60 Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers 92 Cleaners and helpers 
62 Skilled agricultural workers 95 Mining laborers 
71 Building frame and related trades workers  
OCCUPATIONS WITH VERY LOW EARNINGS  
32 Early childhood educators and Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians 91 Domestic, hotel and office cleaners and helpers 
35 Other associate professionals 93 Other elementary occupations in services 
50 Cooks, waiters and bartenders 94 Agricultural, forestry and fishery laborers 
51 Personal service workers 96 Construction laborers 
78 Food processing and related trades workers 97 Manufacturing laborers 
86 Car, van and motorcycle drivers 98 Transport and storage laborers 
90 Elementary occupations (trade)  
Source: Main classification from Spanish National Occupation Classification 1994 (CNO-1994). 
Occupation classification procedure: Using microdata from the EES, we have estimated a wage equation for women aged 20 to 44. 
As covariates, the regression includes age, age squared, educational attainment, seniority in the firm, type of contract, and regional 
and occupation dummies. Using the estimated wage, we grouped the 66 occupations into four categories from “high earnings” to 
“very low earnings”. We have used the classification derived from this procedure to group woman’s occupation in t-1 in the EPA. 
